King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz's four-nation tour in late July must be seen as a bold attempt to defuse a dangerous regional situation and assert the autonomy of Arab decision-making free from external interference.
According to Arab and Western diplomatic sources, the Saudi monarch's visits to Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan have had several ambitious aims: to head off the threat of renewed civil war in Lebanon; to consolidate Syrian-Lebanese relations; to encourage Fatah-Hamas reconciliation at a decisive moment in Palestinian fortunes; and to signal to Washington the Arabs' disillusion with President Barack Obama's Middle East policy, still grossly biased toward Israel.
The volatile Lebanese situation seems to have been the immediate trigger for the King's wide-ranging diplomatic initiative. Hezbollah and its local opponents, notably diehard Christians and hard-line Sunni members of Prime Minister Saad Hariri's Forward Movement, have engaged in a war of words-which seemed in imminent danger of degenerating into violence. At issue were their different attitudes toward the U.N. Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL).
According to some alarmist reports, the STL is preparing to indict a number of Hezbollah members for the murder of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri on Feb. 14, 2005. Pointing to the recent uncovering of several Israeli spy rings in Lebanon-notably in the sensitive communications sector-Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah's secretary-general, denounced the STL as an Israeli plot and vowed pugnaciously never to surrender any of his members to its jurisdiction (see p. 16). Hezbollah's opponents, on the other hand, claim that unless the STL brings Rafiq Hariri's murderers to justice-whoever they may be-there can be no internal peace.
The issue extends far beyond Lebanon because Hezbollah clearly sees the reports as a sinister bid to blacken the resistance movement, spark internal fighting, and provide Israel with an opportunity to attack Lebanon, as it did in 2006, in a further attempt to destroy Hezbollah.
A tripartite summit in Beirut of King Abdullah, Syria's President Bashar Al-Assad and Lebanon's President Michel Suleiman-together with numerous side meetings-has somewhat reduced tensions and calmed fears of war. Among the implicit consequences of these contacts are Saudi Arabia's recognition of the legitimacy of Syria's involvement in Lebanon, as well as a warning to Israel that any further aggression would face a united Arab front.
At the same time, American attempts to limit Syria's influence in Lebanon, to sanction it for its ties with Iran and Hezbollah, and to pit Riyadh against Damascus, have earned Washington a rap on the knuckles. In a sharp statement, the Syrian Foreign Ministry declared that "The United States has no right to define our ties with the countries of the region and to interfere in the content of the talks which the Saudi King will have in Damascus. Syria and Saudi Arabia know better than others the interests of the people of the region and how to achieve them without outside interference..."
Another key Arab leader to preach peace and reconciliation in Beirut this weekend was the emir of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, whose country is financing the reconstruction of villages in south Lebanon destroyed by Israel in 2006. As sponsor of the 2008 Doha accords-which gave Lebanon its first stable government, ending 18 months of political deadlock-Qatar is also a major external player in Lebanon.
This flurry of Arab diplomatic activity is meant to bring home to hotheads in all factions that Lebanon's external Arab sponsors will not tolerate a renewed resort to violence. Another lesson of the gathering-and of the highly symbolic joint visit to Beirut by King Abdullah and the Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad-is that Syrian-Lebanese relations are set fair, and that theirentente enjoys the blessing of the 87-year old Saudi King, the biggest political gun on the Arab scene.
In earlier talks with the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, the Saudi King was evidently anxious to encourage him to pursue his mediation between rival Palestinian factions, on the lines of the Saudi-sponsored Mecca Agreement of February 2007. In the absence of a united Palestinian front, the Palestinian cause will continue to languish. But relations between Fatah and Hamas remain hopelessly deadlocked, with Hamas totally opposed to negotiations with Israel under present conditions.
Fatah leader Mahmoud Abbas, president of the Palestinian Authority, faces the difficult dilemma of whether or not to proceed from proximity talks, mediated by Obama's special envoy George Mitchell, to direct talks with Israel's hard-line Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu. The trouble is that Mitchell's proximity talks have yielded nothing; Netanyahu's 10-month partial settlement freeze has not prevented large-scale Israeli construction, notably in Arab East Jerusalem; while Washington, apparently concerned only with Israel's well-being and indifferent to that of its Arab neighbors, has failed to give Abbas the guarantees he has sought.
Arab leaders are all too aware of President Obama's reluctance, or inability, to exert the slightest pressure on Israel before the congressional midterm elections in November-or even possibly after them. It is this evident American paralysis that has led the Saudi monarch to step into the arena and call on the Arabs to close ranks.
[Author Affiliation]
Patrick Seale is a leading British writer on the Middle East. His latest book is The Struggle for Arab Independence: Riad el-Solh and the Makers of the Modern Middle East (Cambridge University Press). Copyright � 2010 Patrick Seale. Distributed by Agence Global.
King Abdullah Seizes the InitiativeKing Abdullah bin Abdulaziz's four-nation tour in late July must be seen as a bold attempt to defuse a dangerous regional situation and assert the autonomy of Arab decision-making free from external interference.
According to Arab and Western diplomatic sources, the Saudi monarch's visits to Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan have had several ambitious aims: to head off the threat of renewed civil war in Lebanon; to consolidate Syrian-Lebanese relations; to encourage Fatah-Hamas reconciliation at a decisive moment in Palestinian fortunes; and to signal to Washington the Arabs' disillusion with President Barack Obama's Middle East policy, still grossly biased toward Israel.
The volatile Lebanese situation seems to have been the immediate trigger for the King's wide-ranging diplomatic initiative. Hezbollah and its local opponents, notably diehard Christians and hard-line Sunni members of Prime Minister Saad Hariri's Forward Movement, have engaged in a war of words-which seemed in imminent danger of degenerating into violence. At issue were their different attitudes toward the U.N. Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL).
According to some alarmist reports, the STL is preparing to indict a number of Hezbollah members for the murder of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri on Feb. 14, 2005. Pointing to the recent uncovering of several Israeli spy rings in Lebanon-notably in the sensitive communications sector-Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah's secretary-general, denounced the STL as an Israeli plot and vowed pugnaciously never to surrender any of his members to its jurisdiction (see p. 16). Hezbollah's opponents, on the other hand, claim that unless the STL brings Rafiq Hariri's murderers to justice-whoever they may be-there can be no internal peace.
The issue extends far beyond Lebanon because Hezbollah clearly sees the reports as a sinister bid to blacken the resistance movement, spark internal fighting, and provide Israel with an opportunity to attack Lebanon, as it did in 2006, in a further attempt to destroy Hezbollah.
A tripartite summit in Beirut of King Abdullah, Syria's President Bashar Al-Assad and Lebanon's President Michel Suleiman-together with numerous side meetings-has somewhat reduced tensions and calmed fears of war. Among the implicit consequences of these contacts are Saudi Arabia's recognition of the legitimacy of Syria's involvement in Lebanon, as well as a warning to Israel that any further aggression would face a united Arab front.
At the same time, American attempts to limit Syria's influence in Lebanon, to sanction it for its ties with Iran and Hezbollah, and to pit Riyadh against Damascus, have earned Washington a rap on the knuckles. In a sharp statement, the Syrian Foreign Ministry declared that "The United States has no right to define our ties with the countries of the region and to interfere in the content of the talks which the Saudi King will have in Damascus. Syria and Saudi Arabia know better than others the interests of the people of the region and how to achieve them without outside interference..."
Another key Arab leader to preach peace and reconciliation in Beirut this weekend was the emir of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, whose country is financing the reconstruction of villages in south Lebanon destroyed by Israel in 2006. As sponsor of the 2008 Doha accords-which gave Lebanon its first stable government, ending 18 months of political deadlock-Qatar is also a major external player in Lebanon.
This flurry of Arab diplomatic activity is meant to bring home to hotheads in all factions that Lebanon's external Arab sponsors will not tolerate a renewed resort to violence. Another lesson of the gathering-and of the highly symbolic joint visit to Beirut by King Abdullah and the Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad-is that Syrian-Lebanese relations are set fair, and that theirentente enjoys the blessing of the 87-year old Saudi King, the biggest political gun on the Arab scene.
In earlier talks with the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, the Saudi King was evidently anxious to encourage him to pursue his mediation between rival Palestinian factions, on the lines of the Saudi-sponsored Mecca Agreement of February 2007. In the absence of a united Palestinian front, the Palestinian cause will continue to languish. But relations between Fatah and Hamas remain hopelessly deadlocked, with Hamas totally opposed to negotiations with Israel under present conditions.
Fatah leader Mahmoud Abbas, president of the Palestinian Authority, faces the difficult dilemma of whether or not to proceed from proximity talks, mediated by Obama's special envoy George Mitchell, to direct talks with Israel's hard-line Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu. The trouble is that Mitchell's proximity talks have yielded nothing; Netanyahu's 10-month partial settlement freeze has not prevented large-scale Israeli construction, notably in Arab East Jerusalem; while Washington, apparently concerned only with Israel's well-being and indifferent to that of its Arab neighbors, has failed to give Abbas the guarantees he has sought.
Arab leaders are all too aware of President Obama's reluctance, or inability, to exert the slightest pressure on Israel before the congressional midterm elections in November-or even possibly after them. It is this evident American paralysis that has led the Saudi monarch to step into the arena and call on the Arabs to close ranks.
[Author Affiliation]
Patrick Seale is a leading British writer on the Middle East. His latest book is The Struggle for Arab Independence: Riad el-Solh and the Makers of the Modern Middle East (Cambridge University Press). Copyright � 2010 Patrick Seale. Distributed by Agence Global.
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